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assesses the applicability of the SE under such legislation.  A mixed 
methodology was adopted. Fifteen interviews were held with experts. 
Such data was supplemented by 52 valid responses to a questionnaire sent 
both to co-operatives and voluntary organisations (VOs) in Malta.  The 
study concludes that the proposed legislation has various positive social, 
financial and CG implications and that the SE, as being proposed, is 
applicable and filling a void within the Maltese environment. Although 
such legislation offers both a new legal form and a label, its reference to 
the Companies Act which ignores SEs’ unique social dimension is 
questionable. Alternatively, a holistic SE regulatory framework may be 
developed. Furthermore, statutory thresholds, such as for dividend 
distribution and trade income, are to be possibly rendered more flexible.  
This study aspires to raise awareness about the implications of a proposed 
regulatory framework in Malta, hence hopefully promoting the application 
of the concept.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Increased attention is being devoted to social practices in the business landscape (Harding, 
2004). Corporate social responsibility practices are being undertaken by limited liability 
companies (LLCs) (Popescu, 2011) which by nature, seek to maximise shareholder value (Pike 
and Neale, 2009). Furthermore, the co-operative fosters co-operative and ethical values whilst 
operating commercially (Burlò, 2013). The voluntary organisation (VO) may also nurture a 
social purpose. However, VOs may be established for any ‘lawful purpose’, such purpose not 
necessarily being a social one if the organisation has a public interest in terms of Art.2(1) of the 
Maltese Voluntary Organisations Act (Government of Malta, 2007). The social enterprise (SE) 
takes the notion of social responsibility a step further by nurturing a social goal as a fundamental 
principle (Pearce, 2003; Ridley-Duff and Southcombe, 2012). SEs are thus seen to be economic 
vehicles for resolving societal problems (Nicholls, 2006; Thompson, 2008; Westall and 
Chalkley, 2007). In this regard, as shown in Figure 1, one may see a transition from companies 
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to co-operatives to SEs, such that social goals become more important as one progresses, even 
though financial goals continue to play an important role.   
 
Figure 1: From Company to SE 
Presently, there is no universal definition of ‘SE’ (Blount and Nunley, 2015; Lyon and 
Supelveda, 2009; Young and Lecy, 2014). The European Commission has operationalised a 
working definition incorporating three aspects, namely, the financial, social and corporate 
governance (CG) dimensions (Defourny, 2001; Galera and Borzaga, 2009). ‘SE’ has become a 
term overarching those organisations seeking to trade for a primary social aim (Peattie and 
Morley, 2008a; Ridley-Duff and Bull, 2011). Although profits are desirable, the focus is on 
enhancing the ‘common good’ (Ridley-Duff, 2007). Furthermore, SEs may assume different 
legal statuses and legal forms (Kerlin, 2006; Teasdale, 2011; European Commission, 2014).  
The Government of Malta, through the Ministry for the Economy, Investment and Small 
Business (MEIB), proposed the enactment of a Social Enterprise Act (SEA) in June 2015. This 
study should thus prove useful in ascertaining the potential of the SE concept in Malta. The 
study will seek to assess the social, financial and CG implications in Malta of the proposed 
regulatory framework relating to the SE, whilst also assessing the applicability of this type of 
enterprise under the proposed legislation within the Maltese business and social environment.  
The rest of this paper is divided into five sections, the first of which provides a summary of 
relevant literature on the three SE dimensions and the SE concept in Malta. The second section 
outlines the research methodology adopted, while the ensuing sections present an analysis and 
discussion of the findings respectively. The last section summarises the findings, whilst 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 The Social Dimension 
SEs, which primarily seek to attain social and environmental objectives (Hopkins, 2012; Perez 
di Mendiguren Castresana, 2013), typically emerge on initiative of community members 
(Defourny and Nyssens, 2012; Estrin, Mickiewicz and Stephan, 2013) and lead to social 
cohesion through their participatory nature (European Commission, 2013; OECD, 2007). To 
enhance their not-for-profit principle (MEIB, 2015b), certain European legal frameworks do 
not permit (e.g. in Spanish social initiative co-operatives) or otherwise limit (e.g. in British 
Community Interest Companies) the distribution of profit to shareholders (Defourny and 
Nyssens, 2012). This restriction partially signifies that the real objectives of SEs are social, 
whilst preventing other organisations from labelling themselves SEs simply to gain 
unwarranted advantages (Bacchiega and Borzaga, 2001). 
2.2The Financial Dimension 
Trading is the means by which social objectives can be sustained (Meadows and Pike, 2010; 
Moizer and Tracey, 2010; Wilson and Post, 2013). A significant degree of financial risk, 
emerging from trading and the risk of initiative, is tantamount to SEs (Defourny and Nyssens, 
2010b). The lack of funding arrangements may present SEs with a challenge (Peattie and 
Morley, 2008b). Thus, new finance sources have been created through social investment 
(Doherty, Haugh and Lyon, 2014), including those provided through social banks, crowd 
funders with a social platform and microfinance institutions (Périlleux, 2015). SEs may also 
raise finance through debt or loans, the issue of social impact bonds, public sector funds and 
the issue of preference shares (Searing, 2013). Preference shares offer additional flexibility 
since they can be offered as convertible, redeemable and cumulative (Pike and Neale, 2009). 
Moreover, the state can also provide grants and fiscal incentives to SEs (Fisac and Moreno-
Romero, 2015). 
2.3The Corporate Governance Dimension 
Being characterised by a financial dimension, SEs must give due regard to CG (Mason, 
Kirkbride and Bryde, 2007; Mswaka and Aluko, 2015; Spear, Cornforth and Aiken, 2009). In 
Malta, a model Code of Principles of Good CG (hereafter referred to as the ‘Code’) is applicable 
only to listed and licensed companies (MFSA, 2011). Democratic participation is an essential 
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SE characteristic (Galera and Borzaga, 2009) and can be achieved through the involvement of 
multiple stakeholders (Travaglini, Bandini and Mancicone, 2009). SEs having a participatory 
nature are usually more effective (Imperatori and Cataldo Ruta, 2015). However, involving 
different stakeholders at the highest level of an organisation is a bone of contention (Pearce, 
2003; Travaglini et al., 2009). SEs must also exhibit a high degree of autonomy by being free 
to take their own decisions and to terminate their activity (Defourny and Nyssens, 2010a). 
Nevertheless, the state could amend public policies to increase stability within the sector (Park 
and Wilding, 2014; Young and Kim, 2015). SEs could also create new networks and 
partnerships with the intention of marshalling new resources to exploit new opportunities 
(Verreynne, Miles and Harris, 2013). By reporting their social impact, SEs are held accountable 
to achieving their stated social purposes (Bagnoli and Megali, 2009; Kay, 2015). A social audit 
may be a useful tool in this regard (Spreckley, 1997). 
1.1.  The Social Enterprise in Malta 
2.4.1 Current Scene 
The SE concept is somewhat currently employed in Malta through different organisational 
forms, each regulated by separate legislation (DF Advocates and APS Consult Limited 
(DFA&APSCL), 2012). However, some of these organisations operate with certain features 
opposing the ideal SE characteristics espoused by the European Parliament Decision A6-
0015/2009 (ibid., 2012). Maltese law permits the formation of SEs through five different legal 
structures, namely, partnerships, associations and foundations (by virtue of the Civil Code), 
together with trusts and co-operatives established in terms of the Trusts and Trustees Act and 
the Co-operative Societies Act, respectively (DFA&APSCL, 2011; Vassallo and Mifsud, 
2012). In Malta, band and sports clubs are mainly registered as associations in terms of the Civil 
Code, or as VOs. VOs are either registered as such in terms of the Voluntary Organisations Act 
(Government of Malta, 2007), or as associations or foundations as per the Civil Code 
(Government of Malta, 1868). By reference to Art.38(1) of the Voluntary Organisations Act 
(Government of Malta, 2007), VOs are not permitted to trade. However, Art.38(2) permits VOs 
to set up “an appropriate legal entity” to trade with the view of raising money to realise their 
goals if the trade falls outside their stated purposes [by reference to Art.38(4)] (ibid., 2007). 
Art.38(4) further states that if VOs engage in certain activities necessary for achieving their 
purposes, these shall not be considered to constitute trading activities (ibid., 2007).  
2.4.2 Strengthening the Legal Framework in Malta 
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Following on the Belgian and UK models of SE, it has been suggested to introduce a novel 
legal structure for SEs in Malta (DFA&APSCL, 2012). Thus, the MEIB (2015b) has issued a 
White Paper including a draft law entitled ‘Social Enterprise Act’ (hereafter referred to as ‘Draft 
Bill’). The proposal espouses the company as the most desirable form for SEs through the social 
enterprise company (SEC), this providing flexibility, good CG and distinct legal personality, 
whilst enhancing the pursuit of socio-commercial goals (DFA&APSCL, 2012; MEIB, 2015b). 
However, Burlò (2013 p.70) comments that the: “co-operative model beats the LLC model 
hands down in balancing the social and commercial aspects of business”, despite the LLC 
model being more beneficial from a regulatory, CG and cultural perspective (Burlò and 
Baldacchino, 2014). In terms of Art.7(1) (MEIB, 2015a), the Draft Bill permits social purpose 
organisations currently operating under a different legal form than the LLC to obtain the SE 
‘label’ of ‘social enterprise organisation’ (‘SEO’), rather than alter their legal form altogether. 
Art.7(5) (ibid., 2015a) further specifies that in these cases, the legislative instrument pertinent 
to the legal form of the organisation would apply, subject to alterations necessary in the context.  
Art.3(1) of the proposed SEA (MEIB, 2015a) defines the SEC as being established for the 
carrying on of a commercial activity to fulfil a primary social objective (as defined in Art.2) in 
terms of Art.3(1)(a), or to integrate disadvantaged groups back into the labour force as per 
Art.3(1)(b) (ibid., 2015a). Hereafter, SEs set up in terms of Art.3(1)(b) (ibid., 2015a) shall be 
referred to as work integration SEs (WISEs). Such enterprises promote social inclusion by 
integrating unemployed or disadvantaged individuals back into the labour market and society 
through productive activity (Marthe and Nyssens, 2012; Nyssens, 2006; Vidal, 2005). Art.4(1) 
(ibid., 2015a) adds on that in the case of the former type, acts of trade are driven by social 
purposes and at least 70 percent of revenue emanates therefrom; or that at least 30 percent of 
those employed are disadvantaged or disabled (DD) persons when the focus is on the integration 
of such groups.  
Art.3(2) of the Draft Bill on SEs (MEIB, 2015a), in agreement with the European Parliament 
(2009), determines that SECs must not be state-owned, and that VOs, pious foundations and 
ecclesiastical entities are not eligible for registration. Nevertheless, such organisations may hold 
shares in SECs. 
Certain financial provisions are introduced in Art.5 of the proposed Act (ibid., 2015a). 
Primarily, these aim to ensure that profit distribution is limited to 10 percent. SECs will be able 
to raise finance in a similar manner to LLCs, namely through shares and loans. Furthermore, 
by reference to Art.7(5), once an organisation successfully registers as an SEO, all provisions 
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relating to SECs would apply to it “mutatis mutandis” (ibid., 2015a). Additionally, as per Art.25 
(MEIB, 2015a), SEs must file an annual return, including a copy of the year-end accounts and 
annual report with the regulator (ibid., 2015a). SEs are not required to conduct social audits. 
Nonetheless, SECs must adhere to “all the requirements of the Companies Act in relation to 
annual returns, accounts and audits” by reference to Art.25(5). Furthermore, a Social Objectives 
Report outlining how and to what extent the social purposes have been achieved must be 
attached to the annual return filed with the regulator, in terms of Art.25(2)(e) (ibid., 2015a).  
2.4.3 Public Comments to the Draft Bill 
The proposal has been welcomed by the public as “it seeks to fill a legislative void” (Greenpak, 
2015 p.3). A clearly emerging issue is that incentives should be established at the outset 
(Greenpak, 2015; Malta MicroFinance (MMF), 2015; Ministry for the Family and Social 
Solidarity (MFSS), 2015). The incentives recommended include: start up grants, loan 
guarantees, equity schemes, reduced tax rates and rebates on annual fees (ibid., 2015). Further 
proposals comprise the setting up of a social investment bank (MFSS, 2015) and providing 
incentives duly considering DD workers’ needs (Directorate General (Social Policy), 2015). 
Another emerging notion is that the Draft Bill grants wide discretion to the Minister, this 
hindering legal certainty (Greenpak, 2015; MMF, 2015; MFSS, 2015).  
Moreover, the terms ‘SEC’ and ‘SEO’ are not deemed to be clearly defined (MFSS, 2015) and 
the Draft Bill “discriminates against all legal forms other than LLCs” (Malta Co-operative 
Federation (MCF), 2015 p.6). Being more democratic than the LLC form, the co-operative 
model is deemed to lend best as a “preferred” legal form for SE, if one had “to be considered 
at all” (MCF, 2015 p.9). Comments to the Draft Bill also make reference to definitions and 
drafting. For instance, the term ‘migrant worker’ in Art.2 may need to be more clearly defined 
(Pace, 2015 p.1). ‘Migrants entitled to work’ has been suggested as a more suitable term instead 
(MMF, 2015; MFSS, 2015). Furthermore, the term ‘disabled persons’ could be replaced by the 
term “persons with a disability” (Directorate General (Social Policy), 2015 p.1). Moreover, 
requiring 70 percent of income to be derived from trade does not generally reflect the reality of 
the social sector (MMF, 2015; MFSS, 2015). Contrastingly, a higher quota of DD persons has 
been recommended in cases where SEs are established as WISEs (Directorate General (Social 
Policy), 2015). 
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
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1.2. Research Instruments 
A mixed-methods research methodology was adopted, exploiting the advantages of both 
qualitative and quantitative research methods (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Plano Clark 
and Creswell, 2008). A simultaneous QUAL + QUAN triangulation approach (Tashakkori and 
Teddlie, 2010) was used. Certain questions in the research instruments required only comments. 
However, the majority constituted close-ended statements to which respondents expressed their 
opinion using a five-point Likert scale (where 1 corresponded to Strongly Disagree and 5 to 
Strongly Agree). Interviewees substantiated their views through comments. The interview 
schedule contained 37 questions and statements. The questionnaire contained an additional 
three questions, two asking for comments and one relating to demographics. An interview 
schedule was designed, incorporating questions categorised into five sections. An almost 
identical questionnaire was also designed. The first section of the research instruments set the 
context and established reasons for SE legislation. The second section delved into the social 
dimension, whilst the second and third sections focused on the SE financial and CG dimensions 
respectively. The final section sought to collate overall comments and demographic data on 
respondents, the latter in the case of the questionnaire. 
1.3. Sample Selection, Response Rates and Data Analysis 
Initial contact was made with sociologists and lawyers (included in the University of Malta staff 
directory), as well as with politicians involved in the economic and social fields, encouraging 
their participation in an interview. Certain interviewees suggested names of other experts, 
including consultants, accountants and chief executive officers who were keen on the subject 
and thus, they were subsequently contacted. Fifteen semi-structured interviews were carried 
out. An online questionnaire was also sent to representatives from co-operatives, as well as 
Maltese-registered VOs. E-mail addresses of co-operatives were publicly available through the 
website of the Malta Co-operatives Board, while those of VOs in Malta were provided by the 
Office of the Commissioner for VOs. Representatives from both types of entities were treated 
as a homogenous group (namely, entity representatives), to enable a comparison of their views 
with those of experts.  
From a total population of 1,187 organisations of whom 1,060 had valid e-mail addresses, 52 
valid replies were received by the cut-off date, being five weeks after transmission of the 
questionnaire. This resulted in a response rate of 4.91%. Responses were received as follows: 
41 responses (78 percent) from VOs, four (eight percent) from co-operatives, four (eight 
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percent) from sports clubs, two (four percent) from band clubs, while the last response 
originated from a different organisation type to the former-mentioned ones. The Mann-Whitney 
test and the Friedman test were the statistical tests carried out on ordinal questions using the 
Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SPSS). 
4. FINDINGS 
4.1 Setting the Context 
The annotations ‘E’ and ‘R’ will be used throughout the analysis of the findings to represent 
experts and entity representatives, respectively. Furthermore, tables present the mean rating 
scores and standard deviations of the two respondent groups in relation to the respective 
questions in descending order. They also provide the Mann-Whitney test results for significant 
differences between the responses of experts and entity representatives. Results of the Friedman 
test for significant differences between related statements are also listed beneath each table or 
each question’s results. 
Most respondents (E13/15; R29/33) were in favour of introducing SE-specific legislation in view of 
an existing legislative “lacuna”. Effectively, as stated by one expert, “VOs are at one end of 
the pole, whilst LLCs are at the other”, with SEs actually falling “somewhere in between”.  
The main emerging arguments regarding the definition of ‘SEC’ as presented in the proposed 
SEA pertained to the SE’s legal form. Most respondents (E9/15; R5/7) were critical as the definition 
seemed to set the LLC as the predominant SE legal form (E4/9), with some (3/4) preferring the 
adoption of the co-operative form. Others (E5/9; R5/7) were critical because in a number of other 
EU countries, the SE was only a “label”. This latter argument was in line with a number of 
public comments to the Draft Bill. Contrastingly, a number of respondents (E6/15; R2/7) stated that 
making the LLC the main form of SE was beneficial, the LLC model being “more acceptable 
for obtaining finance”.  
Furthermore, most experts (E9/15; R10/33) agreed with Art.3(2) and Art.7(1) of the Draft Bill; the 
first specifically excluding VOs, these being “not commercially sustainable” and therefore, 
different than SEs. However, those in disagreement (E6/15; R23/33) emphasised that amendments 
are required to render it possible to be simultaneously an SE and a VO. This would avoid VOs 
carrying out acts of trade considered to be outside their purposes experiencing inconvenience 
or even forfeiting important benefits under the new Act. 
4.2 Reasons for SE Legislation 
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Table 1 presents results relating to reasons put forward for SE legislation.   
Table 1: Reasons for SE Legislation 
State your level of agreement to the following statements 
giving reasons for specific SE legislation: 




Such regulation entails that their specific social purpose is clear 
upon their setting up 
Experts n=15 4.60 0.910 0.038 
Entity Reps n=52 4.27 0.795  
SEs place priority to serving the community interest Experts n=15 4.33 1.291 0.125 
Entity Reps n=52 4.19 0.908  
SEs may render unique opportunities of autonomy, 
participation and risk-taking in a democratic setting to the 
weaker sectors of society 
Experts n=15 4.33 0.976 0.027 
Entity Reps n=52 3.77 0.962  
The profit-making objective of SEs is secondary to their social 
objectives 
Experts n=15 4.20 1.207 0.092 
Entity Reps n=52 3.71 1.194  
SEs place due importance to the economic dimension by 
trading, in order to ensure sustainability, whilst providing 
returns to the providers of capital 
Experts n=15 4.33 0.976 0.014 
Entity Reps n=52 3.75 0.905  
Unlike most other structures, SEs are required to reserve funds 
for social purposes 
Experts n=15 3.47 1.598 0.720 
Entity Reps n=52 3.73 1.031  
X2(5) = 21.87, p=0.001 
Results indicated significant differences (p=0.001) by all respondents to the six different 
statements. The two respondent groups were convinced that SE regulation entails clarity of the 
specific social purpose upon setting up, with a notable statistical difference arising in results. 
However, two experts cautioned that this did not imply that such purpose could not be subject 
to change in the future. Respondents also agreed that SEs placed priority to serving the 
community interest, whilst taking into account the commercial one. Furthermore, respondents 
believed that SEs rendered various unique opportunities to the weaker sectors of society, with 
a statistical difference arising in results. Yet, two experts remarked that such opportunities 
would probably be lower in the case of an SEC than in that of an SEO because an SEC would 
also be subject to the Maltese Companies Act (CA), which made no particular reference to 
participation.  
Respondents perceived SEs to place importance to the financial dimension by trading, this 
therefore both ensuring sustainability and providing returns on capital, with experts again 
agreeing significantly more. SEs were not identical to any other specific legal structure. 
However, it was noted by one expert that such emphasis on the financial dimension should not 
necessarily be uniform for all SEs, as implied by Art.7(5)(6) of the proposed SEA. Moreover, 
respondents agreed that the profit-making objective should be secondary to SEs’ social 
objective(s). Experts were neutral verging upon agreement, while entity representatives 
marginally agreed that unlike most other legal structures, SEs were required to reserve funds 
for social purposes. Some experts (3/15) noted that while retaining funds for social purposes might 
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be “noble”, a statutorily required high level of retention could endanger financial sustainability, 
leading to capital attrition.  
A number of respondents (E11/15; R5/52) gave additional justifications for SE legislation in Malta. 
Some experts (E5/11) re-emphasised that specific SE legislation could promote more initiatives 
in this sector, resulting in economic gain and benefits to particular sectors of the community. 
Moreover, such legislation could enhance societal benefits, including those resulting from 
sports and the environment (E3/11; R3/5). Others (E3/11; R2/5) believed that self-support among the 
disadvantaged sectors of society could be incentivised, rendering such groups participants in 
the economy.  
4.3 The Social Dimension 
Table 2 presents results regarding statements on the social dimension of SEs.  
Results indicated significant differences (p=0.023) by all respondents to two socially-related 
statements concerning Art.5(2), this setting the ceiling of 10 percent for distribution of profit. 
Respondents agreed that such ceiling ensured that most profits generated would be used for 
social purposes, whilst also ensuring stability of employment for employees, particularly DD 
workers. However, some experts (4/15) added that this also depended on other factors, 
particularly management competence. 
Results indicated significant differences (p=approx.0) by all respondents to four statements about 
SEs’ social dimension. Both experts and entity representatives were convinced that SEs 
contributed social cohesion, with experts agreeing significantly more. However, one expert 
commented that this could be “merely idealistic”. Surprisingly, both sets of respondents held 
that the financial and CG dimensions needed to be given equal importance to the social one. 
This response contrasted that given to an earlier statement, wherein the social purpose was 
stated to dominate the profit-making objective. Only two experts maintained that the social 
dimension was “key”. Furthermore, respondents agreed that SEs helped to reduce social costs, 
with experts being significantly more in agreement. Two experts cautioned that nevertheless, 
the reduction of social costs should not be an SE’s primary aim. Both respondent groups were 
neutral about the statement that the total exclusion of public ownership from SEs may hamper 
the creation of important SEs, which the private sector could be unable or unwilling to set up. 
Those against the statement (9/15) emphasised that if some SEs had to be publicly owned, they 
would lose their autonomy, this supporting the emphasis placed on autonomy in the literature 
(e.g. Defourny and Nyssens, 2010a). 
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Table 2: The Social Dimension 
The Draft Bill sets a ceiling of 10 per cent for distribution 
of profit. To what extent do you agree that this ensures: 




That most of the profits generated are used for social 
purposes? 
Experts n=15 4.00 1.464 0.233 
Entity Reps n=52 3.96 0.969  
 Stability of employment for employees, particularly 
disadvantaged or disabled workers? 
Experts n=15 4.00 1.254 0.110 
Entity Reps n=52 3.73 0.795  
X2(1) = 5.14, p=0.023 
State your level of agreement to the following statements 
relating to the social dimension of SEs: 
 
SEs contribute to social cohesion, enabling members of 
society to come together to a well-needed aim 
Experts n=15 4.47 1.060 0.036 
Entity Reps n=52 4.23 0.614  
For the social objectives to be fulfilled, the other 
dimensions (i.e. the financial and corporate governance 
dimensions) need to be given equal importance 
Experts n=15 4.33 0.900 0.430 
Entity Reps n=52 4.23 0.731  
Through the attainment of their social objectives, SEs help 
reduce social costs 
Experts n=15 4.33 1.234 0.024 
Entity Reps n=52 4.06 0.669  
The total exclusion of public ownership from SEs may 
hamper the creation of important SEs, which the private 
sector may be unable or unwilling to set up 
Experts n=15 2.60 1.595 0.051 
Entity Reps n=52 3.40 0.955  
X2(3) = 43.68, p<0.001 
4.4 The Financial Dimension 
Table 3 presents results regarding statements on the financial dimension of SEs.  
Respondents expressed their level of agreement regarding three finance-related statements 
relating to the profit distribution limitation. Results indicated significant differences (p=approx.0) 
by all respondents to the three different statements. Both experts and entity representatives 
agreed that such ceiling helped towards ensuring SE economic viability, with experts agreeing 
significantly more. However, some experts (4/14) stated that it was significantly probable that at 
10 percent, the ceiling was too low and could need to be increased in the future.  
Table 3: The Financial Dimension 
To what extent do you agree that the ceiling of 10 per 
cent for distribution of profit: 




Ensures the economic viability of SEs through the high 
level of ploughed back profits? 
Experts n=15 4.13 1.246 0.028 
Entity Reps n=52 3.63 0.929  
Discourages providers of capital from contributing 
towards the setting up or expansion of SEs? 
Experts n=15 2.87 1.457 0.446 
Entity Reps n=52 3.12 1.022  
Renders the economic dimension subservient to the social 
one, thereby rendering the entities economically risky? 
Experts n=15 2.00 1.254 0.001 
Entity Reps n=52 3.00 0.886  
X2(2) = 21.76, p<0.001 
In relation to the Draft Bill, state your level of 
agreement to the following statements: 
 
Generating at least 70 per cent of total income from trade 
ensures the economic viability of SEs 
Experts n=15 4.27 0.961 0.016 
Entity Reps n=52 3.87 0.561  
In the case of WISEs, requiring 30 per cent of 
employees to be disadvantaged or disabled members 
of society: 
 
Experts n=15 3.67 1.291 0.253 
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Is a balanced percentage, rendering disadvantaged or 
disabled members of society more employable 
Entity Reps n=52 3.40 0.823  
Is too high as it may render SEs unproductive Experts n=15 2.47 1.187 0.156 
Entity Reps n=52 2.98 1.146  
X2(1) = 7.14, p=0.008 
Current provisions need to supplemented by 
assistance through the inclusion of: 




EU grants and loans Experts n=15 4.73 0.458 0.238 
Entity Reps n=52 4.52 0.610  
Banking support, through specifically trained specialists 
and possibly, branches 
Experts n=15 4.20 1.082 0.619 
Entity Reps n=52 4.25 0.682  
A lower accounting and audit-reporting regimen, varying 
with SE size 
Experts n=15 4.13 1.356 0.051 
Entity Reps n=52 3.50 1.350  
Tax concessions to make up for the extra expenditure 
emanating from the integration of disadvantaged or 
disabled persons 
Experts n=15 3.87 1.685 0.818 
Entity Reps n=52 4.33 0.648  
Amendments to other industry-related legislation Experts n=15 3.60 1.056 0.903 
Entity Reps n=52 3.69 0.701  
A right of first refusal to SEs in Government contracts Experts n=15 2.80 1.568 0.377 
Entity Reps n=52 3.12 1.096  
X2(7) = 106.60, p<0.001 
A contentious issue was that such ceiling discouraged capital providers. Most respondents (9/15) 
emphasised that SE shareholders’ primary motives would be social and altruistic. Furthermore, 
experts disagreed, while entity representatives were neutral regarding the statement that the 
ceiling renders the financial dimension subservient to the social one, thus rendering SEs 
economically risky, the responses of the two groups being significantly different. Most experts 
(11/15) emphasised that this derived directly from the nature of the SE. However, others (4/15) 
cautioned that setting a ceiling at such a low level could in effect be a cause of such 
subservience. 
Respondents believed that requiring 70 percent of total income to be generated from trade 
ensures economic viability, with experts agreeing significantly more. However, some experts 
(3/15) hinted that viability also depended on costs, operations and competitiveness.  
Respondents were asked to rate their agreement to two statements regarding the provision that 
in the case of WISEs, 30 percent of employees must be DD. Results indicated significant 
differences (p=0.008) by all respondents to the two different statements. Experts believed such a 
provision to involve a balanced percentage, rendering DD persons more employable, while 
entity representatives were neutral verging on agreement. Whereas most of the former (10/15) 
remarked that such provision went even beyond increased employability, others (5/15) disagreed 
that such or even a higher percentage alone would be enough to make DD persons more 
employable. Furthermore, experts disagreed while entity representatives had a neutral view that 
such provision is too high, possibly rendering SEs unproductive. The majority (8/15) remarked 
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that this is an “unfair assumption” and although the percentage may be “challenging”, it is 
intended to lead to social inclusion. Others (7/15) commented that the imposition of such a 
percentage might in reality be detrimental to smaller SEs.  
Respondents also indicated their level of agreement in relation to different types of assistance 
that needed to be provided to SEs. Results revealed significant differences (p=approx.0) by all 
respondents to the six different statements. Out of the six incentives, both experts and entity 
representatives agreed to five and were neutral with respect to one. 
Respondents distinctively agreed that current provisions needed to include EU grants and loans, 
including loan guarantees and SE-specific schemes. Banking support was also regarded highly 
by respondents. However, a number of experts (3/15) commented that the “small size of the 
market” could act as a limitation. Conversely, one expert longed for a specialised financial 
institution for SEs. A lower accounting and audit-reporting regimen, varying with SE size was 
also agreed to by both experts and entity representatives, the latter verging on neutral. Most 
experts (12/15) added that the independent audit should nonetheless be retained. Respondents 
further believed that current provisions needed to be supplemented by tax concessions 
compensating for the extra expenditure emanating from the integration of DD persons. 
However, some experts (4/15) hinted that care should be taken not to give the impression that 
employing DD persons would necessarily involve extra expenditure. Respondents marginally 
agreed that amendments were required to other industry-related legislation, including the: 
Value Added Tax Act, Income Tax Act, Malta Enterprise Act and the Malta Business Act. The 
statement that current provisions needed to be supplemented by a right to first refusal to SEs in 
Government contracts led to a controversy. Most experts (8/15) commented that this would render 
SEs “dangerously” dependent on preferential treatment, while others (7/15) saw this as feasible. 
4.5 The Corporate Governance Dimension 
Table 4 presents results concerning statements on the CG dimension of SEs.  
Table 4: The Corporate Governance Dimension 
State your level of agreement to the following statements 
relating to SE regulation: 




Either a regulator or an oversight committee needs to monitor 
the operations of Ses 
Experts n=15 4.20 1.207 0.477 
Entity Reps n=52 4.08 0.737  
Such regulator or oversight committee must be separate from 
those established by existing legal structures 
Experts n=15 3.20 1.656 0.136 
Entity Reps n=52 3.63 1.138  
X2(1) = 7.11, p=0.008 
State your level of agreement to the following statements 
relating to a code of good corporate governance for SEs: 
 
Experts n=15 4.13 0.915 0.080 
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Such Code is to specify that a specific percentage of those 
involved in the corporate governance of SEs, have to be 
knowledgeable of the needs of disadvantaged or disabled 
persons 
Entity Reps n=52 3.71 0.871  
The regulatory framework for SEs needs to include a specific 
code of good corporate governance 
Experts n=15 4.07 1.387 0.424 
Entity Reps n=52 4.23 0.581  
Such Code needs to be mandatory for Ses Experts n=15 3.53 1.727 0.912 
Entity Reps n=52 3.96 0.816  
Including the participation of a disadvantaged or disabled 
person in the Board of Directors will not lead to a lengthier 
decision-making process 
Experts n=15 3.27 1.163 0.295 
Entity Reps n=52 3.50 0.897  
Such Code may require the participation of at least one 
disadvantaged or disabled person in the direction of SEs 
Experts n=15 2.40 1.682 0.027 
Entity Reps n=52 3.31 1.094  
X2(4) = 44.68, p<0.001 




A periodic say, three-year social audit needs to be carried out 
on every SE 
Experts n=15 4.00 1.464 0.326 
Entity Reps n=52 4.00 0.863  
Results indicated significant differences (p=0.008) by all respondents to two statements relating to 
the SE regulator. Both sets of respondents agreed that either a regulator or an oversight 
committee needed to monitor SE operations, with most experts (13/15) commenting they were 
neutral about who would in fact be the monitor, subject to the regulator having the “necessary 
qualifications and skills”. Some experts (7/15) also emphasised the need for a separate monitor, 
while others (5/15) commented that there should not be a proliferation of regulators, but one 
regulator for most, if not all, types of entities.  
Respondents were then presented with five statements relating to a code of good CG for SEs, 
three of which specifically related to WISEs. Results indicated significant differences (p=approx.0) 
by all respondents to the five statements. The two respondent groups held that in the case of 
WISEs, a code of good CG needed to specify that a percentage of those involved in the CG of 
SEs had to be knowledgeable of the needs of DD persons, entity representatives being 
marginally so. Respondents also agreed that the regulatory framework needed to include a 
specific code of good CG. However, four experts asserted that imposing such requirement 
“could disincentivise the setting up of SEs”. Nevertheless, both respondent groups agreed 
(albeit entity representatives marginally) that such Code needed to be mandatory. For most 
experts (9/15), the Maltese culture is not one of self-regulation.  
In relation to whether the participation of a DD person on the Board of Directors would lead to 
a lengthier decision-making process, experts were neutral verging upon agreement whereas 
entity representatives marginally agreed. Experts disagreed that the Code may require the 
participation of at least one DD person on the Board, while entity representatives were neutral 
PAGE 15| Journal of Corporate Governance, Insurance, and Risk Management | 2017, VOL. 4, Series. 1 
 
verging upon agreement, this resulting in a significant difference in results. Some experts (4/15) 
commented that if such a provision was to be introduced, participation needed to be subject to 
the DD person being capable for the job.  
Moreover, both respondent groups agreed that a periodic, say, three-year social audit needed to 
be carried out in every SE. Most experts (12/15) commented however that such an audit needed 
to be “clearly defined” with its “specified parameters”, and with care taken for such audits to 
be “relevant” and “cost-beneficial”.  
4.6 Overall Comments 
The results of the final section of the research instruments are presented in Table 5.  
Table 5: Overall Comments 
State your level of agreement to the following 
statements: 




The Draft Bill as it stands is applicable Experts n=15 3.60 0.910 0.027 
Entity Reps n=52 3.06 0.826  
The Draft Bill needs substantial alterations for it to be 
translated into law 
Experts n=15 3.00 1.648 0.729 
Entity Reps n=52 3.35 0.926  
X2(1) = 1.33, p=0.248 
As regards the statement that the Draft Bill as it stood was applicable, experts marginally agreed 
while entity representatives were neutral, with experts providing a statistically higher level of 
agreement. Most experts (9/15) commented that the proposed SEA was a “good start”, yet calling 
for refinements. Some of those seeing the SEA as inapplicable (2/15) stated that this was as yet 
an incomplete, mostly enabling framework. For example, it was yet to include fiscal benefits 
and ideally, these should be laid out immediately. Conversely, both respondent groups had 
mixed feelings as to whether the Draft Bill needed substantial alterations for it to be translated 
to law. Some experts (7/15) highlighted the need for the SEA to be more “flexible” with respect 
to thresholds and limits.  
In terms of overall response, respondents welcomed SE legislation as “a long-awaited one”. 
Participants also envisaged that SEs would be set up in Malta in the field of community care, 
humanitarian aid, education, health, the environment and restoration, as well as public service 
delivery functions. Furthermore, reference was made to wording and drafting of the legislation. 
For instance, some participants claimed that the terms ‘disabled’ and ‘migrant worker’ should 
be “replaced by more socially acceptable terms”, such as “persons with disability” and 
“migrants entitled to work”. Similar observations were noted in public comments. 
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5. DISCUSSION ON FINDINGS 
5.1 The Regulatory Framework 
5.1.1 Is SE-specific Legislation Required? 
A legislative “lacuna” is existent within the Maltese business landscape as evidenced by the 
findings, in support of public comments. As illustrated in Figure 2, SEs probably fill a gap in 
the legislation, since no other legal structure, save for the social co-operative, has a dominating 
social purpose whilst still devoting attention to financial objectives. LLCs often devote 
minimum attention to benefiting society through corporate social responsibility practices, as 
cited in Popescu (2011). Contrastingly, VOs generally have little concern for financial 
objectives while co-operatives may not be guided primarily by social objectives. 
 
Figure 2: The Social and Financial Objectives in Different Legal Structures 
As advocated in Defourny and Nyssens (2012) and Estrin et al. (2013), SEs emerge on the 
initiative of community members aiming to contribute to the common good (Ridley-Duff, 
2007). However, SEs must necessarily trade to sustain their objectives (e.g. Meadows and Pike, 
2010). Therefore, in line with respondents’ belief, SEs uniquely take into account the 
community interest and the commercial one, with priority being given to the former.  
5.1.2 Label, Legal Form or Either? 
The LLC model has been tried and tested in Malta and as stated by DF&APSCL (2012) and 
Burlò (2013), proved in its own right to be “the most appropriate trading vehicle” (MEIB, 
2015b p.10), in contrast with the co-operative model, as cited in Burlò and Baldacchino (2014). 
Given in particular the deemed predisposition of LLCs in raising finance, one may argue 
whether it is better to require limited liability for all SEs. However, such legal requirement may 
be too restrictive. The issue revolves around the nature of SEs. In this context, the Draft Bill 
seems to offer the best possible solution. It requires limited liability in the case of newly-formed 
SEs (except for VOs) and places these under the specific legal structure of SECs. However, 
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allocated a mere label. Such legal versatility is probably a practicable way of attracting all kinds 
of SEs.  
Accepting the principle of limited liability for SECs does not mean that such entities are 
adopting the LLC legal structure. Therefore, one may question whether Art.3(3) by which all 
provisions of the CA are made applicable to SEs, are appropriate to SECs, and perhaps, by 
virtue of Art.7(5), even more relevantly to SEOs. It could be that the CA provisions are 
insufficient to cover the exigencies of the SE. For example, neither the Draft Bill nor the CA 
refer specifically to any guiding social principles, such as democratic control by members. 
These are referred to only in the White Paper. It could also be that some provisions in the CA, 
such as the reporting requirements, need to be modified in the context of SECs and also SEOs. 
It is difficult to accept that the same legislation as the CA is generally applicable. After all, SEs 
are deemed to be economic vehicles for solving social problems (e.g. Nicholls, 2006). The legal 
framework must therefore not discount such SE predicament.  
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5.2 The Social Dimension  
5.2.1 The Reduction of Social Costs 
There has been general agreement that SEs bring about a reduction in social costs, thereby also 
saving on public expenditure. For instance, the integration of DD persons into the labour market 
should present a win-win situation to DD workers and to the economy, leading to both social 
inclusion and economic growth, as hinted in the literature (e.g. Nyssens, 2006). Moreover, the 
provision of certain services through SEs, including education and healthcare, will result in a 
more affluent society. However, given that attaining the SE’s specific social aims continues to 
be the pivotal aim, to what extent should the public authorities incentivise SEs to give priority 
in their operations to the reduction of social costs? Such public policy will be reflected in the 
kind of incentives to be eventually offered subsequent to SE legislation.  
5.2.2 The Participation of DD Persons 
There is general positivity in relation to WISEs, these being welcomed on the belief that having 
a workforce composed of at least 30 percent DD persons would translate into new opportunities 
and empowerment of such individuals. This even goes beyond the literature (e.g. Marthe and 
Nyssens, 2012; Vidal, 2005), where it is advocated that WISEs promote social inclusion. 
However, the percentage may be challenging, especially to smaller SEs. Therefore, different 
percentages varying with the size and number of years of establishment of an SE may be 
considered. Rather than legally requiring the participation of DD persons on the Board of 
Directors, perhaps, incentives may in due course follow towards promoting such participation. 
After all, as discussed by Galera and Borzaga (2009), Imperatori and Cataldo Ruta (2015), 
Pearce (2003) and Travaglini et al. (2009), while being a bone of contention, participation has 
its benefits. Yet, such a provision could be counterproductive unless the DD persons have the 
skills and qualifications necessary to reside on the Board. Therefore, such criteria cannot be 
ignored.  
5.3 Restrictions, Incentives and Boundaries 
5.3.1 The Restriction on Profit Distribution 
It is believed that retaining a high proportion of profits will ensure that profits generated will 
be used for social purposes and will also help towards ensuring stability of employment for 
employees, particularly DD persons. This sheds light on the fact that SEs work primarily to 
fulfil social objectives, in support of Bacchiega and Borzaga (2001). Such a ceiling is also 
believed to ensure the economic viability of SEs, as advocated in Defourny and Nyssens (2012). 
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However, although it has been claimed that SEs mainly attract altruistic investors, certain 
investors might not be inclined to invest in SEs given that returns are “minimal”. Furthermore, 
although subservience of the financial dimension to the social one is in the very nature of SEs, 
at times, such a limitation could render such entities to be perceived as economically risky. In 
light of these arguments, set at 10 percent, the ceiling may be deemed to be rather low. 
Contrasting positions have been taken in this respect in various EU countries, as stated in the 
literature (e.g. Defourny and Nyssens, 2012). The more one regulates in this area, the more 
difficult it is for financial management to act according to the prevalent circumstances. Perhaps 
a way out of this, if one is to maintain the present distribution limitation, is to encourage other 
sources of capital beyond the minimum capital, such as through the use of preference shares 
issued at a commercial yield. Such a hybrid source of finance may provide the flexibility needed 
by the circumstances.  
5.3.2 A Minimum Level of Trade-Related Income 
In support of Moizier and Tracey (2010) and Wilson and Post (2013), among others, a minimum 
level of trade-related income is believed to further promote economic viability, sustaining the 
SE in its social objectives. Yet, the floor of 70 percent set by the Draft Bill seems to lead to 
controversy. Again, perhaps allowing for some flexibility depending on the number of years of 
establishment of the SE, as well as on its size, might be helpful in encouraging the formation 
of new SEs.  
5.3.3 The Case for Incentives 
Incentives supplementing the legislation are generally expected, similarly to the situation 
abroad, as discussed in Fisac and Moreno-Romero (2015). The immediate introduction of 
incentives would create an aura of legal certainty, hence further solidly encouraging the setting 
up of more SEs, as hinted in public comments received. Conversely, introducing incentives at 
a later stage would ensure that SEs are not set up merely to gain such benefits. Moreover, the 
introduction of such incentives may also need to take its time because amendments to other 
industry-related legislation may be required. EU grants and loans, loan guarantees, SE-specific 
schemes, start-up schemes, tax concessions and banking support (perhaps also through a 
specific bank for SEs) could be part of the incentive schemes offered. One may also think on 
the possibility of new specialised institutions helping SEs, such as whether or not a social 
investment bank should be set up. Such a bank could provide financial services for a social 
purpose, as cited in Périlleux (2015).  
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Rather than simply adopting the requirements of the CA, SEs may have a more specific 
accounting and audit-reporting regimen, varying with SE size, also involving the statutory 
independent audit. More details with respect to the contents and other requirements relating to 
the Social Objectives Report could prove helpful. Furthermore, the outcome and output 
indicators referred to could involve a mixture of social and financial key performance 
indicators. However, there is probably the need for more research in this area. Moreover, as 
advocated in Bagnoli and Megali (2009) and Kay (2015), a periodic exercise in social auditing, 
say, every three years, could help SEs to progress in the achievement of their social objectives.  
5.3.4 The Case against Public Ownership 
As cited in the European Parliament Decision A6-0015/2009 and Defourny and Nyssens 
(2010a), SEs must be autonomous organisations. SEs cannot be autonomous if owned by the 
state. Yet, at times, the private sector may be unable or unwilling to set up SEs. The Government 
may thus help the promotion of SEs by means of Public Private Partnerships or similar 
incentivising legislation, as advocated in Young and Kim (2015). Such partnerships could 
enable SEs to exploit new entrepreneurial opportunities, as described in Verreynne et al. (2013). 
It remains essential that SEs do not become over-dependent on any type of preferential 
treatment that may be meted out by the public authorities. In this context, preferential treatment, 
such as that allowed by the EU Public Procurement Directive (2014/24/EU) may perhaps best 
be conceded in the initial years of operation.  
5.4 The Governance Dilemmas  
5.4.1 Who is to Regulate? 
One may argue that a separate regulating body could wholly devote its attention to SEs. 
However, it may perhaps be time to have a large body integrating the regulation of most types 
of legal structures, such as co-operatives, companies and SEs. Such a body would probably turn 
out to be stronger and more effective, leaving no room for inter-regulator miscommunications 
and gaps. Furthermore, the need for the Minister to intervene in the registration of an SE as 
stipulated in Art.6(3) and Art.7(1) of the proposed SEA is probably not called for, and may lead 
to unnecessary controversy.  
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5.4.2 Regulations 
A specific code of good CG for SEs is warranted to prove useful, such Code being 
recommended to be mandatory in view of the Maltese culture working against self-regulation. 
In response to the argument that certain provisions might be somewhat burdensome for SEs, a 
Code with a ‘comply or explain’ requirement could be introduced for SEs. Such Code could 
become applicable only for SEs of a reasonable size.   
5.4.3 Lack of Awareness and Misconceptions 
Maltese co-operatives and VOs seem to be insufficiently aware of the peculiarities of the SE 
concept and seem to have common misconceptions about it, as evidenced by certain responses 
in the study. Thus, for the SE concept to succeed, the enactment of the law must be accompanied 
by more communication by the public authorities with these entities; the availability of training 
and educational material with further help in this regard.  
6. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In summary, the SE has various positive social, financial and CG implications and is applicable 
within the Maltese environment. It is envisaged that once converted into legislation, it will fill 
a missing void relating to such entities having a dominant social objective and a secondary 
financial one. Regarding the argument, ‘SE Label vs. Legal Form’, the Draft Bill seems to 
present the best of both worlds, offering both a new legal form – that of SEC, as well as a mere 
‘label’ – that of SEO. However, current CA provisions may be insufficiently applicable to SECs 
and probably, even less applicable to SEOs, which by Art.7(5) of the Draft Bill are also required 
to follow some of its provisions. Reference to social objectives may need to be made within the 
CA itself and modifications to reporting requirements may be required. An alternative could be 
a more developed SE regulatory framework. 
The imposition of a number of floors, such as the percentage of trade-related income may be 
too challenging for smaller SEs. A progressive minimum level over the initial years may thus 
be called for. The SE could be rendered more effective through member participation on the 
Board of Directors. Such participation could be encouraged through incentives on condition of 
possessing the necessary qualifications and skills. There is also a clear need for guidelines 
relating to the proposed Social Objectives Report. The need or otherwise for a tailor-made 
accounting and audit-reporting regimen possibly varying with SE size will have to be 
determined. A periodic social audit would prove beneficial here. Over time, various new 
PAGE 22| Journal of Corporate Governance, Insurance, and Risk Management | 2017, VOL. 4, Series. 1 
 
incentives will probably be introduced, priority perhaps best being conceded to incentivise SE 
formation.  
Moreover, integrating SE regulation within an established regulatory body would probably be 
advantageous as past expertise could be availed of. The specific SE characteristics would in 
time lead to more specialised regulation. This study has also shown the need to focus legally 
on the relevant code of good CG for SEs. The extent to which such Code will be required to be 
obligatory, to include recommendations, and/or be subject to the ‘comply or explain’ provision 
requires further research.   
In interpreting the findings and results, one needs to keep in mind that owing to the relatively 
low response rate, the resulting margin of error indicates a notable limitation in the extent to 
which the responses are representative of the whole population.  
This study recommends that the link between the CA and the SEA be re-assessed. Furthermore, 
the varying sizes of SEs should be taken into account in the setting of thresholds. Incentives 
and benefits should also complement SE legislation within a reasonable time period. It is also 
recommended that SEs seek other sources of finance beyond equity capital, including 
preference shares and loan capital. Reporting requirements in the law should also be rendered 
more detailed and communication about the SE concept should be carried out with the 
stakeholders of existing legal structures. 
This study has also shed light on a number of areas that would merit further research, including 
the introduction of a social audit for the Maltese SE. The CG of Maltese SEs, together with 
their regulator also beckon further study, as do the links and distinctions between SEs and co-
operatives. 
References 
Bacchiega, A. and Borzaga, C. (2001). Social enterprises as incentive structures - An 
economic analysis. In: C. BORZAGA and J. DEFOURNY, eds., The Emergence of Social 
Enterprise. First edn. London: Routledge, pp. 273-295.  
Bagnoli, L. and Megali, C. (2009). Measuring performance in social enterprises. Nonprofit 
and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 40(1), pp. 149-165.  
Blount, J. and Nunley, P. (2015). Social Enterprise, Corporate Objectives, and the Corporate 
Governance Narrative. American Business Law Journal, 52(2), pp. 201-254.  
PAGE 23| Journal of Corporate Governance, Insurance, and Risk Management | 2017, VOL. 4, Series. 1 
 
Brannen, J. (2005). Mixed methods research: A discussion paper. Discussion Paper. London: 
ESRC National Centre for Research Methods.  
Burlò, D. and Baldacchino, P.J. (2014). Co-operative or Company? A Maltese Comparative 
Analysis. E-newsletter edn. Belgium: International Co-operative Alliance. 
http://ica.coop/en/media/news/co-operative-or-company-maltese-comparative-analysis [1 
September 2015]. 
Burlò, D. (2013). Co-operative or Limited Liability Company? A Comparative Analysis in a 
Maltese Setting, University of Malta.  
Defourny, J. and Nyssens, M. (2010a). Conceptions of social enterprise and social 
entrepreneurship in Europe and the United States: Convergences and divergences. Journal of 
social entrepreneurship, 1(1), pp. 32-53.  
Defourny, J. and Nyssens, M. (2010b). Social enterprise in Europe: At the crossroads of 
market, public policies and third sector. Policy and Society, 29(3), pp. 231-242.  
Defourny, J. and Nyssens, M. (2012). The EMES approach of social enterprise in a 
comparative perspective. Working Paper 12/03. EMES European Research Network, Liege. 
Available at: http://www.emes.net/site/wp-content/uploads/EMES-WP-12-03_Defourny-
Nyssens.pdf  
Defourny, J. (2001). Introduction: from third sector to social enterprise. In: C. Borzaga and J. 
Defourny, eds., The Emergence of Social Enterprise. First edn. New York: Routledge, pp. 1-
28.  
DF Advocates and APS Consult Limited (DF&APSCL) (2011). Social Enterprise Sector - 
Executive Summary. Malta: MFEI.  
DF Advocates and APS Consult Limited (DF&APSCL) (2012). Social Enterprise Project. 
Malta: MFEI.  
Directorate General (Social Policy) (2015). Comments on the Social Enterprise Act White 
Paper. Malta.  
Doherty, B., Haugh, H. and Lyon, F. (2014). Social Enterprises as Hybrid Organizations: A 
Review and Research Agenda. International Journal of Management Reviews, 16(4), pp. 417-
436.  
PAGE 24| Journal of Corporate Governance, Insurance, and Risk Management | 2017, VOL. 4, Series. 1 
 
Estrin, S., Mickiewicz, T. and Stephan, U. (2013). Entrepreneurship, Social Capital, and 
Institutions: Social and Commercial Entrepreneurship Across Nations. Entrepreneurship 
Theory and Practice, 37(3), pp. 479-504.  
European Commission (2014). A map of social enterprises and their eco-systems in Europe: 
Executive Summary. Belgium: European Commission.  
European Parliament (2009). European Parliament Decision A6-0015/2009. European Union.  
Fisac, R. and Moreno-Romero, A. (2015). Understanding social enterprise country models: 
Spain. Social Enterprise Journal, 11(2), pp. 156-177.  
Galera, G. and Borzaga, C. (2009). Social enterprise: An international overview of its 
conceptual evolution and legal implementation. Social Enterprise Journal, 5(3), pp. 210-228.  
Government of Malta (1868). Civil Code (c. 16). Malta. 
Government of Malta (1988). Trusts and Trustees Act (c. 331). Malta. 
Government of Malta (1995). Companies Act (c. 386). Malta.  
Government of Malta (2001). Co-operative Societies Act (c. 442). Malta.  
Government of Malta (2007). Voluntary Organisations Act (c. 492). Malta.  
Greenpak Co-op Society Limited (2015). Response to the Social Enterprise Act White Paper. 
Malta.  
Harding, R. (2014). Social Enterprise: The New Economic Engine? Business Strategy Review, 
15(4), pp. 39-43.  
Hopkins, A. (2012). From a service to a business: the development of a social enterprise. 
Primary Health Care, 22(6), pp. 24-26.  
Imperatori, B. and Cataldo Ruta, D. (2015). Designing a social enterprise: Organization 
configuration and social stakeholders’ work involvement. Social Enterprise Journal, 11(3), 
pp. 321-346.  
Johnson, R.B. and Onwuegbuzie, A.J. (2004). Mixed Methods Research: A Research 
Paradigm Whose Time Has Come. Educational Researcher, 33(7), pp. 14-26.  
Kay, A., 31 December 2015, 2015-last update, Assessing Social Enterprise and their impacts: 
Are we looking at the right stuff?. 
PAGE 25| Journal of Corporate Governance, Insurance, and Risk Management | 2017, VOL. 4, Series. 1 
 
https://socialauditnetwork.wordpress.com/2015/12/31/assessing-social-enterprise-and-their-
impacts-are-we-looking-at-the-right-stuff/ [17 February 2016].  
Kerlin, J.A. (2006). Social Enterprise in the United States and Europe: Understanding and 
Learning from the Differences. Voluntas, 17(3), pp. 246-262.  
Lyon, F. and Sepulveda, L. (2009). Mapping social enterprises: past approaches, challenges 
and future directions. Social Enterprise Journal, 5(1), pp. 83-94.  
Malta Co-operative Federation (MCF) (2015). Recommendation and comments on the White 
Paper and the proposed Social Enterprise Act. Malta.  
Malta Micro Finance (MMF) (2015). Comments on the Social Enterprise Act White Paper. 
Malta.  
Mason, C., Kirkbride, J. and Bryde, D. (2007). From stakeholders to institutions: the changing 
face of social enterprise governance theory. Management Decision, 45(2), pp. 284-301.  
Meadows, M. and Pike, M. (2010). Performance management for social enterprises. Systemic 
practice and action research, 23(2), pp. 127-141.  
MFSA (2011). The Code of Principles of Good Corporate Governance. Malta.  
Ministry for the Economy, Investment and Small Business (MEIB) (2015a). Social Enterprise 
Act. Malta: Government of Malta.  
Ministry for the Economy, Investment and Small Business (MEIB) (2015b). The Social 
Enterprise Act - White Paper: Consultation Document. Malta: Government of Malta.  
Ministry for the Family and Social Solidarity (MFSS) (2015). Comments on the Social 
Enterprise Act White Paper. Malta.  
Moizer, J. and Tracey, P. (2010). Strategy making in social enterprise: The role of resource 
allocation and its effects on organizational sustainability. Systems Research and Behavioural 
Science, 27(3), pp. 252-266.  
Mswaka, W. and Aluko, O. (2015). Corporate governance practices and outcomes in social 
enterprises in the UK: a case study of South Yorkshire. International journal of public sector 
management, 28(1), pp. 57-71.  
Nicholls, A. (2006). Introduction. In: A. NICHOLLS, ed., Social Entrepreneurship - New 
Models of Sustainable Social Change. First edn. New York: Oxford University Press Inc., pp. 
1-36.  
PAGE 26| Journal of Corporate Governance, Insurance, and Risk Management | 2017, VOL. 4, Series. 1 
 
Nyssens, M. (2006). Social enterprise at the crossroads of market, public policy and civil 
society. In: M. NYSSENS, ed., Social Enterprise: At the crossroads of market, public policies 
and civil society. First edn. New York: Routledge, pp. 313-328.  
Oecd (2007). Social Enterprise In An Evolving Economy: From Non-Profit Organizations To 
Social Enterpirses. Summary Report. Bucharest: OECD.  
Pace, C. (2015). Comments on the Social Enterprise Act White Paper. Malta.  
Park, C. and Wilding, M. (2014). An exploratory study on the potential of social enterprise to 
act as the institutional glue of network governance. The Social Science Journal, 51(1), pp. 
120-129.  
Pearce, J. (2003). Social Enterprise in Anytown. First edn. London, United Kingdom: 
Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation.  
Peattie, K. and Morley, A. (2008a). Eight paradoxes of the social enterprise research agenda. 
Social Enterprise Journal, 4(2), pp. 91-107.  
Peattie, K. and Morley, A.S. (2008b). Social enterprises: diversity and dynamics, contexts 
and contributions. Cardiff: BRASS/ESRC/Social Enterprise Coalition.  
Perez De Mendiguren Castresana, J.C. (2013). Social enterprise in the development agenda. 
Opening a new road map or just a new vehicle to travel the same route? Social Enterprise 
Journal, 9(3), pp. 247-268.  
Périlleux, A. (2015). When social enterprises engage in finance: agents of change in lending 
relationships, a Belgian typology. Strategic Change, 24(3), pp. 285-300.  
Pike, R. and Neale, B. (2009). Corporate Finance and Investment: Decisions and Strategies. 
Sixth edn. Essex: Pearson Education Limited.  
Plano Clark, V.L. and Creswell, J.W., eds. (2008). The Mixed Methods Reader. First edn. 
California: Sage Publications Inc.  
Popescu, R.F. (2011). Connections between the Concepts of Corporate Social Responsibility 
and Social Enterprise. Euro Economica, (27), pp. 53-59.  
Ridley-Duff, R. and Bull, M. (2011). Understanding social enterprise: Theory and practice. 
First edn. London: Sage Publications.  
Ridley-Duff, R. and Southcombe, C. (2012). The Social Enterprise Mark: a critical review of 
its conceptual dimensions. Social Enterprise Journal, 8(3), pp. 178-200.  
PAGE 27| Journal of Corporate Governance, Insurance, and Risk Management | 2017, VOL. 4, Series. 1 
 
Ridley-Duff, R. (2007). Communitarian Perspectives on Social Enterprise*. Corporate 
governance: an international review, 15(2), pp. 382-392.  
Searing, E. (2013). Feeding the Social Enterprise Zoo: Variants between Corporate Forms, 
4th EMES International Research Conference on Social Enterprise, July 1-4 2013, EMES-
SOCENT.  
Spear, R., Cornforth, C. and Aiken, M. (2009). The Governance Challenges of Social 
Enterprises: Evidence from a UK Empirical Study. Annals of Public and Cooperative 
Economics, 80(2), pp. 247-273.  
Spreckley, F. (1997). Has social audit a role in community enterprise and co‐operative 
organisations?*. Social and Environmental Accountability Journal, 17(2), pp. 16-17.  
Tashakkori, A. and Teddlie, C., eds. (2010). Sage Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social and 
Behavioural Research. Second edn. California: Sage Publications Inc.  
Teasdale, S. (2011). What’s in a name? Making sense of social enterprise discourses. Public 
Policy and Administration, 27(2), pp. 99-119.  
Thompson, J.L. (2008). Social enterprise and social entrepreneurship: where have we 
reached?: A summary of issues and discussion points. Social Enterprise Journal, 4(2), pp. 
149-161.  
Travaglini, C., Bandini, F. and Mancinone, K. (2009). Social enterprise in Europe: 
governance models, 2nd EMES international conference on social enterprise, July 1-4 2004 
2009, EMES European Research Network, pp. 1-26.  
Vassallo, M. and Mifsud, C. (2012). Social economy - laying the groundwork for innovative 
solutions to today's challenges: Comment Paper Malta, Peer Review on the Social Economy, 
10-11 December 2012 2012, European Commission.  
Verreynne, M., Miles, M.P. and Harris, C. (2013). A short note on entrepreneurship as 
method: a social enterprise perspective. International Entrepreneurship and Management 
Journal, 9(1), pp. 113-128.  
Vidal, I. (2005). Social Enterprise and Social Inclusion: Social Enterprises in the Sphere of 
Work Integration. International Journal of Public Administration, 28(9-10), pp. 807-825.  
Westall, A. and Chalkley, D. (2007). Social Enterprise Futures. London: The Smith Institute.  
PAGE 28| Journal of Corporate Governance, Insurance, and Risk Management | 2017, VOL. 4, Series. 1 
 
Wilson, F. and Post, J.E. (2013). Business models for people, planet (& profits): exploring the 
phenomena of social business, a market-based approach to social value creation. Small 
Business Economics, 40(3), pp. 715-737.  
Young, D.R. and Kim, C. (2015). Can social enterprises remain sustainable and mission-
focused? Applying resiliency theory. Social Enterprise Journal, 11(3), pp. 233-259.  
Young, D.R. and Lecy, J.D. (2014). Defining the universe of social enterprise: Competing 
metaphors. VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 
25(5), pp. 1307-1332.  
 
